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INTRODUCTION
Imagine an up-and-coming company hires you as one of its first employees. Passionate about
your employer, you put in long hours doing everything from marketing to accounting to event
planning. You are also proud of your employer’s product, so you begin to publicize it to your
friends through your social network accounts. (In fact, the company’s founder is also one of your
Facebook friends.) You tell your friends about the product launch, invite them to marketing
events, and eventually blog about your industry, amassing a significant social media following
while creating buzz about your employer. But one day, during layoffs unrelated to your own
efforts, you are fired. As you walk out the door, your supervisor asks you to return the office
keys, your parking pass, and . . . administrative rights to your social media profiles. Can this be?
The term “social media” encompasses any online platform that allows individuals to
communicate, create content, and interact socially. 1 Social media can include blogs, wikis,
podcasts, photos and video sharing, virtual worlds, and social networking sites such as LinkedIn,
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter.2 For individuals, social media can be the digital representation
of the self online. Social media profiles are fora for communication, self-expression, identity
creation, and relationship-building in front of audiences of few or many. The phenomenon of
social media—and its use in business—is less than a decade old.3 It is thus no surprise that both
normative and legal questions regularly test its limits.
The ubiquity and accessibility of social media has proven enticing to businesses and
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See, e.g., Simeon Edosomwan et al., The History of Social Media and Its Impact on Business, 16 J. APPLIED
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Alexander Naito, Comment, A Fourth Amendment Status Update: Applying Constitutional Privacy Protection to
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institutions, which increasingly use it as a low-cost marketing, sales, and branding tool. The
presence of businesses on social media is thus growing rapidly. Recent studies show that the
overwhelming majority of Fortune 500 companies are active on social media: ninety-seven
percent have a presence on LinkedIn. 4 Over eighty percent have corporate Facebook accounts
and eighty-three percent use Twitter at least once every thirty days.5 These trends mirror those of
smaller businesses, whose success often depends on the strength of their relationships with
customers and other constituencies.6
But the mere existence of a social media presence cannot alone anthropomorphize an
institution, or cultivate valuable relationships. Individuals—employees and agents—work to
create and advertise the institutional identity and create relationships through their own posts,
content, and management of complex networks of individual and business relationships.
Although the practice of social media management is ubiquitous, the work of these modern-day
Cyranos is caught in a blurred7 and legally undefined territory where the personal melds with the
professional. Sometimes, employees create the company’s profile as individuals, becoming
personally bound to user contracts with the social network providers. These employees may
control the password and access to the company account. In other cases, employees may use
their own profiles to boost their company’s notoriety alongside their own, or write their own
industry-related blogs whose goodwill spills over to the author’s employer. Or companies might
encourage employees to foster their own social media presence to enhance professional
connections and reputation. The result, in physical terms, is both a personal calling card and a
company billboard, sharing the attention of a coveted audience.8
When employers and employees who have shared a social media profile part ways, who
retains the right to control the Twitter feed, the Facebook page, or the blog? More specifically,
who keeps the social media audience?9 What legal interest, if any, should a person obtain in the
4

Nora Ganlm Barnes & Ava M. Lescault, The 2014 Fortune 500 and Social Media: LinkedIn Dominates as Use of
Newer Tools Explodes, CHARLTON COLL. OF BUS. CTR. FOR MKTG. RESEARCH, UNIV. OF MASS. DARTMOUTH
(2014), http://www.umassd.edu/cmr/socialmediaresearch/2014fortune500/. The University of Massachusetts
Dartmouth Center for Marketing Research surveyed Fortune 500 companies recognized as of May 2014 to compile
data on company usage of social media platforms including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Google+, Foursquare,
Pinterest, YouTube, and others. Id.
5

Id.

6

A recent survey revealed that the majority of small businesses have an online presence, which they use primarily
for business networking. NAT’L SMALL BUS. ASSOC., 2013 SMALL BUSINESS TECHNOLOGY SURVEY (2013),
http://www.nsba.biz/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Technology-Survey-2013.pdf.
Several scholars have described the online convergence of personal and work-related as “blurred.” See Lauren
Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and “Blurry-Edged” Social Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1316 (2009); see also
Patricia Sánchez Abril et al., Blurred Boundaries: Social Media Privacy and the Twenty-First-Century Employee, 49
AM. BUS. L.J. 63, 95 (2012); Robert Sprague, Invasion of the Social Networks: Blurring the Line Between Personal
Life and the Employment Relationship, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 12 n.72 (2011).
7
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It is worth noting that people use social media for many reasons, including communication, companionship, and
connectivity. This article focuses narrowly on those accounts whose primary or secondary purpose is to promote a
business or a professional.
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intention to garner attention, reputation, or an audience, as social media audience management. While different
websites describe their participants differently—as friends, followers, or connections—we selected “audience” as a
website-neutral descriptor that captures the aim of those who promote a business on social media.
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social network of virtual friends that person has amassed while on the job?
In the absence of a clear agreement, the employer is likely to demand the ongoing right to
control communications with present and potential customers. The employee, on the other hand,
may wish to maintain the relationships, and, in some cases, the digital persona that she has
nurtured. Relationships carry value—and demand hard work to cultivate and maintain. But can a
digital self and the cultivated relationships ever be property? What rights, if any, should attach to
this new type of amassed virtual audience?
Disputes over post-employment retention of social media are increasingly common.10 For
employees, interests range from the dignitary (control of their virtual identities and goodwill) to
the financial (ability to reap the benefits accruing from their amassed audience). Employers, on
the other hand, have legitimate interests in promoting their brands, maintaining access to their
customers, and keeping their employees’ work product. However, the law does not provide clear
guidance,11 and relatively little scholarly work has been written about this issue.12 As a result,
employers and employees face undue uncertainty when it comes to ownership of social media
content and audiences.
This article posits two reasons for the generalized unease. The first is the lack of an
established legal rubric addressing employee social media rights. The second, and related, factor
is an overly tentative (and sometimes erroneous) conceptualization of social media’s existing
norms, the work exerted in cultivating an audience, its value, and the reputational and financial
harms that can ensue when a digital forum is unjustifiably usurped from its rightful holder. This
article addresses the legal and normative issues in turn and concludes with a way forward. We
argue that, with few exceptions, individuals should be entitled to protection against those who
seek to misappropriate their work, personae, and goodwill on social media for economic gain. It
proposes a multifactor analysis that is protective of employee personality yet considerate of the
employer’s reasonable business interests.
Part I explores the existing law. First, it examines recent illustrative court cases regarding
the post-employment control of social media audiences.13 Analysis of these cases reveals that
this legal question does not fit neatly into conventional interpretations or areas of law. Is this a
matter of property law? Or perhaps contract law? Do we engage the law of trade secrets to
See Carrie Pixler Ryerson & John Balitis, Jr., Social Media’s Lessons: Employers Adapt as Viewers, Publishers,
48 ARIZ. ATT’Y., Apr. 2012, at 17, 17 (“As more and more employers are using social media for their own gain, a
new controversy has emerged. Employers now are embroiled in litigation against former employees over the issue of
who owns social media pages and accounts: the employer or the employee.”); Hugh McLaughlin, Comment, You’re
Fired: Pack Everything but Your Social Media Passwords, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 87, 90–91 (2015).
10

11

See Zoe Argento, Whose Social Network Account? A Trade Secret Approach to Allocating Rights, 19 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 201, 205 (2013) (“This is a new area with no clear legal framework.”); Thomas C.
Mahlum & Andrew J. Pieper, From the Experts: Company vs. Employee Ownership of Social Media Assets, CORP.
COUNSEL (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.robinskaplan.com/~/media/PDFs/From%20the%20ExpertsCompany%20vs%20Employee%20Ownership%20of%20Social%20Media%20Assets.pdf (“The ‘ownership’ of
relationships formed and maintained by a company’s employees, however, remains something of an open question,
and is largely in the eye of the beholder.”).
12

See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 10; Argento, supra note 11; Tiffany A. Miao, Note, Access Denied: How Social
Media Accounts Fall Outside the Scope of Intellectual Property Law and Into the Realm of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1017 (2013); Courtney J. Mitchell, Note, Keep Your
Friends Close: A Framework for Addressing Rights to Social Media Contacts, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1459 (2014).
13

See infra notes 16–19.
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resolve these issues? Or is intellectual property or tort law better suited to address them? We
assert that the conundrum surrounding the applicable law is due in part to a lack of understanding
of the exercise and value of social media in the business context. To that end, Part II analyzes
social media through the lens of social science and business, describing it with five fundamental
tenets that can ultimately inform its legal protection. Social media audience management is a
creative, dynamic, and generative process whose fruits—networked relationships—can be
inextricably interwoven with the individual. Given this intimate tie to personhood and the
complexity of extricating the personal from the professional, Part III proposes a multifactor
framework grounded in a theory of publicity rights to guide its resolution. With roots in both
privacy and property, publicity rights protect the unjustified commercialization or exploitation of
another’s name, likeness, reputation, accomplishments, or endorsement.14 The right recognizes
that intangible fruits of one’s persona carry value, which must be protected in the vein of
property.15 Since social media is the dominant disseminator of publicity today and it offers
widespread notoriety to many, adopting a framework informed by the well-established law of
publicity rights is both logical and desirable.

THE UNTETHERED LAW OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS IN SOCIAL MEDIA

I.

Given the ubiquity of social media as a marketing tool and its blurring of personal and
professional, it is hardly surprising that employees have begun to defend their rights and
creations in social media. Four recent cases—PhoneDog v. Kravitz,16 Eagle v. Morgan,17
Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Group,18 and Mattocks v. Black Entertainment Television
LLC19—elucidate this burgeoning legal issue in diverse industries and on varied social media
sites. In this section, we first briefly discuss the cases and their holdings. We then examine in
more detail the various legal claims and arguments put forth by the litigants. Their analysis sheds
light on the current confusion regarding applicable law and uncovers some fundamental
misconceptions about social media, both of which must be clarified for a coherent solution to
emerge.
A.

Four Representative Cases

In PhoneDog v. Kravitz, the plaintiff PhoneDog.com is a website that provides interactive news
14

See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953); Ettore v. Philco Television
Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 484 (3d Cir. 1956).
According to the Restatement, “[o]ne who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW
INST. 1977). The comments also make clear that “the right created by [§ 652C] is in the nature of a property
right.” Id. § 652 cmt. a; see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (“[T]he State’s
interest [in permitting a ‘right of publicity’] is closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing
on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors . . . .”).
15

16

No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011).

17

No. 11-4303, 2013 WL 943350 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013).

18

No. 10 C 7811, 2014 WL 812401 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014).

19

43 F. Supp. 3d 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
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and reviews about cellular phones and mobile devices. In April 2006, PhoneDog hired Noah
Kravitz as a product reviewer and video blogger. 20 In this capacity, Kravitz was charged with
submitting written and video content, which PhoneDog then disseminated to its users through a
variety of online mediums, including its website and Twitter account.21 As part of his
employment, Kravitz was given a Twitter account named “@PhoneDog_Noah” for which he
created a password.22 In his four years with PhoneDog, Kravitz accumulated approximately
17,000 Twitter followers.23
When Kravitz resigned in 2010, PhoneDog demanded he hand over the use of his Twitter
account, which he had popularized during his tenure at PhoneDog. 24 But PhoneDog did not have
a policy regarding retention of social media accounts. 25 Kravitz refused, and, in protest,
continued to use the account to communicate with his followers but changed the handle from
“@PhoneDog_Noah” to “@noahkravitz.”26 PhoneDog claimed that the Twitter password was a
trade secret, and its continued unauthorized use was misappropriation, and sued Kravitz on four
claims: 1) misappropriation of trade secrets; 2) conversion; and 3) intentional and 4) negligent
interference with prospective economic advantage. 27 Could a Twitter password be a trade
secret—a proprietary interest capable of being misappropriated by its own creator?
Employee Kravitz argued that the password to the Twitter account could not be a trade
secret because it was neither valuable nor secret. Passwords, he argued, could carry no actual or
economic value because they merely allow individuals to login to an account to view
information. Moreover, Kravitz himself created the password, and his employer made no attempt
to secure its secrecy.28
On Kravitz’s motion to dismiss, the court dismissed the claims for intentional and
negligent interference, but allowed the claims for conversion and misappropriation of trade
secrets to go forward, accepting (for purposes of ruling on the motion to dismiss) that under
certain circumstances a Twitter password could be a trade secret.29 The parties eventually entered
into a confidential settlement that allowed Kravitz to maintain sole custody of the Twitter
account and its thousands of followers.30 The case settled amidst public confusion and
20

PhoneDog, 2011 WL 5415612 at *1.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id. at *4.

26

Id. at *1.

27

Id.

28

Id. at *6.

Id. at *7–10; see also Argento, supra note 11, at 266 (noting that “in the trade secret context, a court must
carefully scrutinize the circumstances and the objective manifestations of each party to determine the nature of the
agreement”); David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly Important, 27 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1091, 1109 & n. 106 (2012) (suggesting that new technologies and trends can cause the scope of trade
secret law to shrink).
29

30

Jessica Mendelson, Former PhoneDog Employee Off the Hook in Closely Watched Trade Secrets Spat, TRADING
SECRETS (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2012/12/articles/trade-secrets/2351; Chris Taylor, Writer
Sued for His Twitter Followers Settles Case, MASHABLE (Dec. 3, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/12/03/noah-
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speculation, leaving the law unsettled.
In Eagle v. Morgan,31 Linda Eagle was an executive and founder of Edcomm, Inc., an
education and business training company focused on the banking industry. Well-known in her
industry, Eagle was often published and quoted on professional matters. In 2009, Edcomm
decided to begin using a LinkedIn profile as a sales and marketing tool.32 At the enthusiastic
urging of Edcomm’s then-CEO, Eagle “created her own LinkedIn account using her Edcomm email address,” engaging on the site on both her personal and her company’s behalf.33 Through
this social network, Eagle promoted the company’s services, fostered her reputation, stayed
connected with friends and family, and built social and professional relationships.34 Eagle’s
assistant had access to her account for the purpose of managing and updating its content.35
LinkedIn’s User Agreement made explicit that users owned their accounts and were
individually bound to the User Agreement, regardless of whether their use was on behalf of an
employer.36 Although Edcomm neither required employees to use Linkedin nor paid for its
employees’ LinkedIn accounts, it provided them certain guidelines as to posted content. 37
However, these guidelines did not address the company’s right to access or control the
accounts.38
After Edcomm was sold, the new owners terminated Eagle and hired Sandi Morgan in
her place.39 Edcomm then accessed Eagle’s LinkedIn account and changed the password and the
account profile to display Morgan’s name and photograph.40 For approximately two weeks,
Eagle was locked out of what she believed to be “her” LinkedIn account, causing her to lose
messages and feel that her virtual personality had been hijacked.41 During this time, an Internet
search for Eagle’s name produced the LinkedIn account that bore Morgan’s name and likeness.42
Although Edcomm returned the account to Eagle within a month, she sued her former company
and the individuals involved for a medley of claims: (1) unauthorized use of name; (2) invasion
of privacy by misappropriation of identity; (3) misappropriation of publicity; (4) identity theft;
(5) conversion; (6) tortious interference with contract; (7) civil conspiracy; and (8) civil aiding
and abetting.43 Was the nature of Eagle’s harm dignitary, proprietary, or both? What would be its
kravitz-lawsuit-twitter.
31

No. 11-4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013).

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id.

35

Id. at *3.

36

Id. at *1.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Id. at *3.

41

See id. at *10.

42

Id. at *3.

43

Id. at *6. In an earlier 2012 decision in the case, the court dismissed the federal law claims alleging violation of
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (1986) (amending Pub. L. No. 98-473, §
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correspondent remedy? Under which of these assorted legal bases could Eagle recover?
Following a non-jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of all of the individually named
defendants.44 Edcomm was awarded judgment on the counts of identity theft, conversion,
tortious interference with contract, civil conspiracy, and civil aiding and abetting,45 and the court
dismissed Edcomm’s counterclaim that Eagle had actually misappropriated the LinkedIn account
as her own.46
Eagle, did, however, succeed on her claims for unauthorized use of name (in violation of
Pennsylvania law), misappropriation of publicity, and invasion of privacy by misappropriation of
identity—a tort prohibiting both the commercial and noncommercial use of another’s image or
likeness.47 The court acknowledged that Edcomm had improperly usurped Eagle’s digital
persona to her detriment.48 The court reasoned that by virtue of the existence of her LinkedIn
membership, Eagle had a contractual relationship with LinkedIn and noted that the LinkedIn
User Agreement clearly indicated that the individual user controlled the account. 49 By entering
her account and changing her password, Edcomm had acted with purpose or intent to harm Eagle
by preventing that relationship from continuing. 50
The court concluded that Eagle had proved tortious interference by her employer but
failed to prove any damages with reasonable certainty.51 It noted that “[a]side from her own selfserving testimony that she regularly maintained business through LinkedIn, Plaintiff failed to
point to one contract, one client, one prospect, or one deal that could have been, but was not
obtained during the period she did not have full access to her LinkedIn account.”52
The court further held that even if Eagle “had made a showing of a ‘fair probability’ that
she sustained some damages[,] . . . she failed to provide a reasonably fair basis for calculating
such damages.”53 Although Eagle succeeded in her privacy cause of action, the court awarded
neither compensatory nor punitive damages.54 Thus, even when a plaintiff has a valid cause of
action in a post-employment social media dispute, it is not clear whether the plaintiff is limited to
equitable remedies alone.

2102, 98 Stat. 1837, 2190 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(2)(c) (2012)), and the Lanham Act,
Pub. L. No. 79–489, tit. VI, § 32, 60 Stat. 427, 437 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1)(A)
(2012)). See Eagle v Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2012 WL 4739436 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012).
44

Eagle, 2013 WL 943350, at *17.

45

Id.

46

Id. at *16.

47

Id. at *17.

48

Id. at *13–16.

49

Id. at *11.

50

Id.

51

Id. at *17.

52

Id. at *13.

53

Id. at *14. Eagle did present one witness to establish damages, but that witness was never properly qualified as an
expert. Id.
54

Id. at *17.
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In Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Group,55 Jill Maremont was employed as the
Director of Marketing, Public Relations, and E-commerce at the Susan Fredman Design Group
(SFDG).56 As part of her job, she wrote the “Designer Diaries: Tales from the Interior” blog hosted
on the SFDG website.57 Through her personal Facebook and Twitter accounts, Maremont
promoted SFDG by frequently posting links to her employer. 58 At SFDG’s request, she created a
company Facebook page.59 Per Facebook’s policy, a company page can only be created through a
personal Facebook account.60 As a result of this policy, Maremont created and accessed SFDG’s
company Facebook page required through her personal account.61 Maremont was also a frequent
contributor on Twitter, on behalf of SFDG and on her own behalf.62 She stored various social
media passwords on an electronic spreadsheet on an SFDG-owned computer.63
Maremont was seriously injured in an automobile accident, which caused her to
temporarily abandon her job and all social media communications.64 SFDG’s own marketing
efforts continued in spite of Maremont’s absence.65 During Maremont’s convalescence, SFDG
accessed and posted seventeen times from her Twitter account without her consent. Some
postings notified readers that the account would be maintained by her temporary replacement. 66
Other messages were in the first person, giving readers the impression that she wrote them.67
Maremont sued, alleging that SFDG’s actions violated: (1) the Lanham Act 68 (false
endorsement); (2) the Stored Communications Act 69 (“SCA”); (3) the Illinois Right of Publicity
55

No. 10 C 7811, 2014 WL 812401 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014)

56

Id. at *1.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Set up A Page, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/business/learn/set-up-facebook-page/ (last visited Mar. 14,
2016).
61

Maremont, 2014 WL 812401, at *2. The parties contested whether or not Maremont made other employees
administrators of the page (meaning they would not need to access her personal Facebook account to manage the
company page). This factual question was left to the jury. Id. at *6. Giving access to a personal password would
violate Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, which prohibits users from sharing passwords,
allowing others to access the account, or transferring accounts to others without the written permission of Facebook.
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last updated Jan. 30,
2015).
62

Maremont, 2014 WL 812401, at *1.

63

Id. at *2.

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Id. Maremont also claimed that SFDG accessed her personal Facebook page, but she was unable to provide any
evidence to support her claim. Id.
67

Id. at *5.

68

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).

69

Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. II, § 2701, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)
(2012)) (“[W]hoever (1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic
communication service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby
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Act;70 and (4) a common law right to privacy. 71
In March 2011, the court dismissed Maremont’s common law invasion of privacy claim,
holding that the Illinois Right of Publicity Act replaced the common-law tort of appropriation of
likeness.72 Maremont maintained that she had “sufficiently alleged two other common law
invasion of privacy torts: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another and (2) a
claim based on publicity that reasonably places another in a false light before the public.” 73 The
court disagreed, holding that Maremont:
fail[ed] to develop her argument that Defendants’ intrusion into her personal
“digital life” is actionable under the common law theory of unreasonable intrusion
upon the seclusion of another. Meanwhile, viewing the facts and all reasonable
inferences in Maremont’s favor, she has failed to sufficiently allege a false light
claim because she has not alleged that Defendants acted with actual malice, nor has
she alleged special damages.74
In December 2011, the court granted summary judgment to SFDG on the Illinois right of
publicity claim as well as a renewed common-law right of privacy claim—intrusion upon
seclusion.75 The court held that Maremont failed to meet the elements of the Right of Publicity
Act—(1) an appropriation of one’s name or likeness; (2) without written consent; and (3) for
another’s commercial benefit—because SFDG did not appropriate Maremont’s identity.76 SFDG
announced Maremont’s absence and the fact that a guest blogger would be filling in for
Maremont during her absence; thus, SFDG did not attempt to “pass themselves off as
Maremont.”77 Furthermore, Maremont’s intrusion upon seclusion claim failed because
Maremont could not “point to any private information upon which Defendants intruded.” 78
In March 2014, the court granted SFDG summary judgment on the Lanham Act claim. 79
Although the court recognized that “[w]hen viewed in the light most favorable to Maremont, a

obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage
in such system [violates the SCA].”). The SCA authorizes civil suits for damages for victims of such unauthorized
access. Id. § 2707.
765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075/30(a) (2016) (“A person may not use an individual’s identity for commercial purposes
during the individual’s lifetime without having obtained previous written consent from the appropriate person or
persons . . . or their authorized representative.”).
70

71

Maremont, 2014 WL 812401, at *1.

72

Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., 772 F. Supp. 2d 967, 972 (N.D. Ill. 2011).

73

Id. at 972.

74

Id. at 973 (citation omitted).

75

Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., No. 10 C 7811, 2011 WL 6101949, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2011).

76

Id. at *7.

77

Id.

Id. at *8. To prove an intrusion upon seclusion claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) an unauthorized intrusion into
seclusion; (2) the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; (3) the matter intruded upon was
private; and (4) the intrusion caused the plaintiffs anguish and suffering.” Id. (quoting Cooney v. Chicago Pub.
Schs., 407 Ill. App. 3d 358, 366 (2010)).
78

79

Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., No. 10 C 7811, 2014 WL 812401, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014).
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jury could find . . . that Defendants committed a Lanham Act violation,” 80 it also recognized that
Maremont “submitted no proof of cognizable damages.” 81
The Stored Communications Act claim was allowed to proceed to trial, primarily because
the court found that Maremont “need not prove actual damages in order to be entitled to statutory
damages for an SCA violation.”82 The case—on the sole remaining claim of the SCA violation—
did go to trial, but that did not end favorably for Maremont either. In October 2014, a jury
returned a verdict in favor of SFDG. 83 Following the trial, the court awarded SFDG $4,401.14 in
costs associated with defending the SCA claim.84 Maremont’s case is currently on appeal with
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.85
Finally, Mattocks v. Black Entertainment Television86 involved a Facebook fan page
Stacey Mattocks created in 2008 focusing on a television series called “The Game,” which aired
on Black Entertainment Network (BET) and focused on the personal lives of professional
football players.87 Mattocks’s fan page was not official, nor did it initially contain BETsponsored content.88 However, it amassed two million “likes” and, in 2010, caught the attention
of executives at BET.89 In January 2011, BET hired Mattocks on a part-time basis to manage the
show’s Facebook page.90 Upon Mattocks’s employment, BET began to supply her with exclusive
and copyrighted content and to prominently display its trademarks on her Facebook page, which
subsequently became official and whose likes grew to six million.91 One month later, the parties
agreed to share administrative rights over the page, meaning that they could not prevent one
another from posting content, making changes, or accessing the page or its audience.92
Despite a seemingly fruitful union, the relationship severed. In June of the following
year, as Mattocks and BET negotiated her possible full-time employment, Mattocks unilaterally
restricted BET’s administrative access to the page and informed it that she would do so “[u]ntil
80

Id.

Id. To recover under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff “must show that she ‘suffered actual injury, i.e., a loss of sales,
profits, or present value (goodwill),’ or that Defendants were unjustly enriched.” Id. (citations omitted). At her
deposition, Maremont denied suffering any financial injury, admitting that her damages claim was limited to mental
distress. Later—after the close of discovery—Maremont claimed that she was entitled to a portion of SFDG’s gross
sales for the period during which SFDG posted to her social media accounts. Id. Because the latter damages were
never disclosed during discovery, the court struck Maremont’s evidence related to that claimed injury. Without a
“basis from which to award Maremont any recovery if she succeeded in proving her Lanham Act claim,” the court
granted SFDG summary judgment on the Lanham Act claim. Id. at *5.
81

82

Id. at *7 (citations omitted).

83

Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., No. 10 C 7811, 2015 WL 638503, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2015).

84

Id.

85

Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., No. 15-1548 (7th Cir. filed Mar. 13, 2015).

86

43 F. Supp. 3d 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2014).

87

Id. at 1314–15.

88

Id. at 1315.

89

Id. at 1316.

90

Id. at 1315.

91

Id. at 1316.

92

Id.
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such time as we can reach an amicable and mutually beneficial resolution” concerning her
employment.93 In reaction, BET created another official Facebook page for the series and asked
Facebook to migrate the likes on the Mattocks-created page to its new page.94 Facebook granted
BET’s request after its internal review determined that the new page was in fact the now-official
representative of the brand owner.95 BET was also able to disable the Twitter account used by
Mattocks to promote the show.96
Mattocks sued BET for (1) tortious interference with contractual relationships she had
with Facebook and Twitter; (2) breach of employment contract; (3) breach of duty of good faith
and fair dealing; and (4) conversion of business interest.97 BET prevailed on all of the claims at
the summary judgment stage. As to the tortious interference claim, Mattocks did not succeed
because BET was not a stranger to the contract between Mattocks and Facebook. 98 Because of
the contract between Mattocks and BET and BET’s prior control over content posted on
Mattocks’s page, BET had a financial interest in the contractual relationship between Mattocks
and Facebook.99 BET was also awarded summary judgment on the breach of contract and breach
of good faith and fair dealing claims because Mattocks had first breached the contract by
restricting BET’s access to the Facebook page.100
Finally, Mattocks’s conversion claim rested on whether an intangible “like” could be a
verifiable business interest. Mattocks alleged that the “substantial interest” in the Facebook page
and the “significant number of ‘Likes’” she generated provided her with business
opportunities—opportunities BET willfully deprived her of by transferring the likes to a different
page.101 The court, however, held that Mattocks could not establish that she owned a property
interest in the Facebook likes.102 Furthermore, even if she could have established a property
interest, she could not prove that BET’s migration request was unauthorized or wrongful. 103
Kravitz, Eagle, Maremont, and Mattocks created social media exposure for their
employers through the use of their individual skills, contacts, and social media identities. Like
many other employees today, they operated in an uncertain environment. On one hand, they were
encouraged to promote their firms online (and indeed, for some, it was part of the job). On the
other hand, the control over the fruits of their labor was left entirely undefined. None had
contracts making explicit their rights (or lack thereof) in their social media accounts or

93

Id. (alteration in original).

94

Id.

95

Id. at 1317.

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Id. at 1319.

99

Id.

100

Id. at 1319–21.

101

Id. at 1321.

Id. (“[I]f anyone can be deemed to own the ‘likes’ on a Page, it is the individual users responsible for them.
Given the tenuous relationship between “likes” on a Facebook Page and the creator of the Page, the ‘likes’ cannot be
converted in the same manner as goodwill or other intangible business interests.”) (citation omitted).
102

103

Id.
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audiences. Yet, the four employees shared strong entitlements, which may or may not be
acknowledged by current law.
Although they sued on diverse and questionably applicable claims, these cases boil down
to the employees’ entitlement over their digital self-ownership. The employees’ ire grew out of
their need to: (1) continue to access the social media audiences they attracted, (2) control their
own online identities, and (3) sever the association between their online personae and their
former firms, so as to prevent the former employers from trading on their personal reputation and
social media relationships. The outcomes of these contentious cases would impact not only the
employees’ identities, but also their abilities to exercise their trades and communicate with their
online cohorts.
As Table 1 illustrates, the lawsuits focus on disparate legal claims, from personal
property to privacy, tort to intellectual property—as if to test which would best apply. Indeed,
litigants, courts, and commentators, clearly uncertain about applicable law, have conceptualized
the reality and rights associated with a social media profile in a variety of different ways. Deeper
analysis of these claims is necessary to understand how the law can and should provide a remedy
to social media litigants.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
B.

A Mixed Bag of Legal Claims

Before analyzing the various claims in detail, it is helpful to parse the discrete aspects of social
media to which litigants may feel entitled.104 A cursory analysis of the popular press and
blogosphere reveals confusion about the legal rights a person has to his social media accounts. 105
Articles about the PhoneDog and Eagle cases often include the word “ownership” in the title,106
or profess to cover the topic of ownership of online accounts.107 Some courts have also referred
104

See Mahlum & Pieper, supra note 11 (“[Answering the question of] who owns social media assets accessed or
controlled by company employees [involves identifying the three different parts of a social media account:] the basic
user information, . . . user-generated content[, and] . . . the relationships . . . which are the driving force behind social
media sites.”).
Rachael E. Ferrante, Comment, The Relationship Between Digital Assets and Their Transference at Death: “It’s
Complicated,” 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 37, 42 (2013); see also Venkat Balasubramani, Employee’s Claims Against
Employer for Unauthorized Use of Social Media Accounts Move Forward—Maremont v. SF Design Grp., TECH. &
MKTG. L. BLOG (Dec. 8, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/12/maremont_v_sfg.htm (“Property-wise,
it’s tough to slot the accounts in a particular box.”).
105

106

See, e.g., Robert B. Milligan, Federal Court Questions Whether Damages Exist in LinkedIn Account Ownership
Dispute, TRADING SECRETS (Mar. 2, 2013), http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2013/03/articles/trade-secrets/federalcourt-questions-whether-damages-exist-in-linkedin-account-ownership-dispute/ (“The ownership of social media
accounts in the employment context remains a very hot topic.”); Amy McIlwain, Social Media Ownership: Is it a
Business Account or Personal Account, FIN. SOC. MEDIA (Oct. 10, 2013), http://financialsocialmedia.com/socialmedia-ownership-business-account-personal-account/.
See, e.g., Miao, supra note 12 (“Given the benefits and competitive necessity, for at least some businesses, to use
social media, explicit ownership of an SMA [(social media account)] allows a business to control how and what it
communicates to its customers and to the public.”); Jennifer L. Parent, Advising Clients on Today’s Top Employment
Law Issues, in EMPLOYMENT LAW 2013: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATEGIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR
50 (Aspatore Thought Leadership ed., 2013) (“A more difficult issue raised by these types of cases involves
ownership over an employee’s individual LinkedIn accounts.”); Robert J. Kolansky, Note, Can We Really Ascribe a
Dollar Amount to Interpersonal Communication? How PhoneDog v. Kravitz May Decide Who Owns a Twitter
107
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to “ownership” of social media accounts.108 Although they generally demonstrate society’s
disorientation regarding who controls social media accounts, the slippery semantics are also
misleading as to the law. The legal reality is that social media accounts are comprised of a
bundle of rights, not all of which are legally recognized.
On a basic level, an employee might claim rights to the content on the social media page,
such as text, pictures, and logos. The right to posted content is beyond the scope of this inquiry
because it is addressed by referring to established tenets of intellectual property law and the
terms and conditions of the host websites. The harder questions—and the ones with which the
law has struggled—involve the continued right to access and control the account and retain its
amassed audience. Among other exercises, the right to control the account allows its holder to
continue using the medium as a platform for speech and to make administrative and content
changes (including limiting membership). Such was the dispute in Eagle and Maremont. The
right to “keep” or “take” the account’s membership allows its holder to either migrate the
audience to another social media account (unrelated to the employer or employee) or, more
generally, retain the ability to continue contacting them.109 This was the nature of the dispute in
PhoneDog110 and Mattocks.111 We will refer to the interests related to the rights to access and
control the account, as well as the right to retain the audience, as “administrative rights.”112 After
a brief discussion of claims regarding content posted to a social media site, we will turn to an
analysis of administrative rights, considering the issue through the lens of the laws of (1) trade
secret, (2) contract, (3) personal property, and (4) privacy.
Intellectual property law governs any personal property interest in content posted on
Account, 20 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 133 (2013); Jeffrey Gross, Court Rules that LinkedIn Account Belongs
to Employee, not Employer, NYTECHLITIGATION.COM (Mar. 15, 2013), http://nytechlitigation.com/court-rules-thatlinkedin-account-belongs-to-employee-not-employer/ (“Who owns a social media account, the employer or the
employee, if there is no written corporate policy on point?”).
108

PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011). The PhoneDog
opinion found “that PhoneDog has adequately alleged that it owns . . . the Account.” Id. The Eagle court used
similar language, implying that such ownership would entitle the user to the login information, all content posted on
the profile, and all contacts associated with the account. Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *11
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013) (“[T]he LinkedIn User Agreement clearly indicated that the individual user owned the
account.”).
109

Venkat Balasubramani, Battle Over LinkedIn Account Between Employer and Employee Largely Gutted—Eagle
v. Morgan, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Oct. 7, 2012),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/10/court_dismisses_8.htm (“As with all of these disputes, control over the
account itself should be separated from access to contact information or ongoing ability to contact customers, which
is what the employer really cares about.”).
110

See supra notes 20–30 and accompanying text.

111

See supra notes 86–103 and accompanying text.

Some have referred to social media profiles and online accounts as “digital assets,” distinct from the content they
contain. The question of how digital assets should be characterized has been much discussed in the law, often with
regard to the transference of digital assets upon death, divorce, or bankruptcy. The term “digital assets” has also
been subject to varying definitions, which leaves the term vague. See Rachel Pinch, Note, Protecting Digital Assets
After Death: Issues to Consider in Planning for Your Digital Estate, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 545, 547–48 (2014);
Michael D. Roy, Note, Beyond the Digital Asset Dilemma: Will Online Services Revolutionize Estate Planning?, 24
QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 376, 384 (2011); Kristina Sherry, Comment, What Happens to Our Facebook Accounts
When We Die?: Probate Versus Policy and the Fate of Social-Media Assets Postmortem, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 185,
193–94 (2012).
112
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social media profiles.113 Social media content is the subject of a copyright or trademark,
especially in a business context. Social media posts, photos, and videos are protected by
copyright. Trademark law protects a company name and logo. Aside from content that is
protected by a company’s trademarks or copyrights, users are the sole owners of the content
posted on their social media profiles. All three major social networking sites—Facebook,
LinkedIn and Twitter—give users ownership over the content of their profiles.114 In other words,
while the social media sites maintain ownership of the actual accounts,115 they stake no claim to
user-generated content—the user retains the intellectual property rights to his creations.
The sites’ terms of service governing user rights are written for individuals, not
necessarily businesses who employ individuals to speak for them.116 In the absence of a contract
or policy outlining the post-employment retention of intellectual property rights to content posted
on social media, employers and former employees will be forced to duke it out on traditional
copyright theories of work-made-for-hire and joint authorship. If the posts were made in the
employee’s scope of employment,117 copyright law’s work-made-for-hire doctrine would apply
and the employer will hold all rights to the work.118 If the employee did not author the posts as
part of his job, the content on the company profile might be considered a work of joint
authorship. Under this theory, both parties are coauthors and co-owners and have the ability to
restrict changes to the work, the use of their name, and claim to authorship.119 These legal
theories are well established; their applicability in any given case relies heavily on the

113

See Bethany N. Whitfield, Comment, Social Media @ Work: #PolicyNeeded, 66 ARK. L. REV. 843, 868 (2013)
(“Determination of ownership rights in the content posted by an employee, however, is an entirely different matter.
One may determine ownership of social-media content by evaluating several factors, including the circumstances
that imply ownership, an ownership agreement regarding social-media posts, and content entitled to copyright
protection. Therefore, employers should proactively define their social-media rights.”) (emphasis in original)
(footnotes omitted).
114

See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 61, at § 2; User Agreement, § 2, LINKEDIN,
https://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement?trk=hb_ft_userag (last updated Oct. 23, 2014); Twitter Terms of
Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos (last updated Jan. 27, 2016).
115

User Agreement, supra note 114, § 3.1; Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 114, § 4; Jason Mazzone,
Facebook’s Afterlife, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1643, 1648–49 (2012) (“Facebook’s terms of use (called ‘Statement of Rights
and Responsibilities’), to which every user must agree in accessing the Facebook site, do not specifically state that
Facebook retains ownership of individual Facebook accounts. Nonetheless, several key provisions make clear that,
according to Facebook, accounts are not property owned by individual users. For one thing, Facebook imposes
numerous restrictions on how a Facebook account can be used. Users who violate the ‘letter or spirit’ of Facebook’s
terms lose access to the site. Thus, what Facebook users possess is the ability to access the Facebook site via an
account so long as they comply with Facebook’s terms.”) (footnotes omitted).
116

Many businesses are wary of social media as a conduit for the infringement or dilution of intellectual property, or
dissemination of trade secrets or disparaging information. See Abril et al., supra note 7, at 90 (noting that on social
media, “[a] disgruntled employee can easily divulge trade secrets, intellectual property, or confidential
information—or can harm the organization’s reputation with disparaging commentary. Even a well-intentioned but
reckless employee can tarnish an organization by disseminating potential evidence of the organization’s negligence,
immorality, or incompetence.”).
117

Ardis Health, LLC v. Nankivell, No. 11 Civ. 5013(NRB), 2011 WL 4965172, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2011)
(finding employee’s duties included maintaining social media accounts).
118

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).

119

Id. § 106A(a) (2012).
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circumstances of each case.
Intellectual property law addresses only the issue of who retains rights to the content
posted on a social media account. It does not directly address the issue at the core of the cases
discussed in this article—the right to access and control of the account itself and its associated
audience. Plaintiffs typically allege a host of varied and often-unsuccessful claims, including
violations of trade secret (regarding the account’s password), privacy, and contract law. Some
have also alleged conversion and other property-related claims. These different claims through
which litigants have presented rights in a social media profile and its related audience have merit,
although a closer look reveals their limitations. We address the merits and drawbacks of trade
secret, contract, personal property, and privacy, in turn.
1.

Trade Secret

Some plaintiffs have claimed that social media passwords are trade secrets and their continued
unauthorized use constitutes misappropriation.120 Other litigants have gone further, claiming that
the list of social media friends or followers was, itself, a trade secret.121 Can a password or a
social media audience be a trade secret?
A determination of whether information, be it a username and password or a social media
audience, rises to the level of a trade secret is a highly fact-specific inquiry that will depend upon
an analysis of several factors.
First, it must not be generally known or readily ascertainable to those who might
obtain economic value from its use. In other words, it must be secret, at least with
regard to potential competitors. Second, the information must derive independent
economic value from being secret. Third, the information must be subject to
reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. 122
One scholar has argued that account access information (specifically a username and
password) meets the three requirements to be a trade secret. Professor Argento argues:
The secret of access to the social network account—the password—should be
protectable as a trade secret. A password’s secrecy confers independent economic
value by giving the account holder exclusive access to the links in the account. This
trade secret protection, however, would be highly limited. It would protect only
access to the account, but not any content otherwise available to the public.
Crucially, any other user could still contact the account’s followers through other
accounts. Although narrow, trade secret protection would protect the interest at the

120

See PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011).

121

See Christou v. Beatport, LLC, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1062 (D. Colo. 2012). Christou involves a long battle
between a nightclub owner and a former employee-turned-competitor regarding once jointly-controlled MySpace
profiles. Id. The plaintiffs claimed that the list of friends associated with those profiles were trade secrets akin to a
customer list. Id. at 1074. The court concluded that the plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to maintain their trade secret
claim at the motion to dismiss stage. Id. at 1076. The plaintiffs subsequently withdrew their trade secret claim during
trial. See Christou v. Beatport, LLC, No. 10–cv–02912–RBJ–KMT, 2014 WL 1293296 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2014).
122

Argento, supra note 11, at 249 (footnotes omitted); see also, Jasmine McNealy, Who Owns Your Friends?:
PhoneDog v. Kravitz and Business Claims of Trade Secret in Social Media Information, 39 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH L.J. 30, 36–37 (2013).
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heart of these disputes: the right to retain exclusive access to the account’s
followers.123

Argento’s analysis, although compelling, falls short. A username and password that grant
access to a profile simply do not have independent economic value and thus cannot be a trade
secret. Access information can be analogized to keys to a safe deposit box. The value of the keys,
like a username and password, is arguably temporary because they are only the means with
which to retrieve the property or information contained inside. Without content to be accessed,
the keys have no value. Once those assets are accessed, the keys are inconsequential. Their value
is not independent, but in fact is dependent upon the desirability or value of the contents they
unlock. Indeed, just as physical keys and locks can be changed, passwords can also be easily
altered, rendering the prior version valueless. 124 Further, relying on the flimsy trade secrecy of
passwords leaves the social media audience unprotected. As we have contended, the interest at
the heart of these disputes centers on administrative rights—the continued ability to interact with
an audience, not the one-time access to the profile.
Application of trade secret law to social media audiences is similarly problematic. Can
social media relationships or contacts ever be trade secrets? Such a claim has arisen in at least
two recent cases, with little resolution. In CDM Media USA, Inc. v. Simms,125 a marketing
company claimed that a former employee misappropriated a trade secret when he continued to
use the LinkedIn group that he created during his employment. Although the court denied a
motion to dismiss, it suggested that whether the list of its 679 members constituted a trade secret
would depend on information regarding the contents, configuration, and function of the LinkedIn
group.126 A second case, Christou v. Beatport, LLC, involves a long battle between nightclub
owners and a former employee-turned-competitor regarding the right to access a MySpace
profile and control the contacts associated with the account.127 The former employer claimed that
the lists of friends associated with its social media profiles were trade secrets.128 The defendants
argued that such contacts could not possibly constitute trade secrets because they were available
to the public and not secret.129 The Christou court, ruling on a motion to dismiss, found that the
question of whether a social media contact list was a trade secret is a question of fact, and that
the plaintiffs had alleged enough facts to withstand a motion to dismiss.130 Given that both of
these cases concluded at the preliminary motion to dismiss stage, they provide little guidance.
123

Argento, supra note 11, at 205 (footnotes omitted).

124

See Miao, supra note 12, at 1048–49. But see Kyle-Beth Hilfer, Minimizing Legal Risks for Clients Using Social
Media to Advertise and Market Their Brands, 38 WESTCHESTER B.J. 35, 42 (2012), http://wcbany.siteym.com/resource/resmgr/Journals/2012_ws_hilfer.pdf (arguing that employers should “file trademarks for
[employees’ social media] handles, and they should control the administration and passwords for the accounts to
strengthen their claims of ownership”).
125

No. 14 CV 9111, 2015 WL 1399050 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2015).

126

Id. at *4.

127

Christou v. Beatport, LLC, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1074–75 (D. Colo. 2012).

128

Id. at 1074.

129

Id. at 1074–75.

130

Id. at 1076. In a March 31, 2014 Order, the judge ruled that the trade secret claims, withdrawn by the plaintiffs
during trial, were not made in bad faith as there was evidence the Myspace password was taken, but the Order does
not elaborate on whether it is a trade secret. See Christou v. Beatport, LLC, No. 10–cv–02912–RBJ–KMT, 2014 WL
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Many scholars and courts have viewed a social media audience as simply a subscriber or
customer list.131 Under this perspective, determining rights to a social media audience through a
trade secret analysis makes sense, since trade secret law is the traditional method of protection
for a customer list. However, as will be explained in Part II, this characterization of a social
media audience will often be overly simplistic and outdated. It breaks down when applied to the
reality of a social media audience, which is fluid and dynamic rather than a static list of
names.132
The Christou court hinted at recognition of the richness of a social media audience. The
judge wrote:
Social networking sites enable companies. . . to acquire hundreds and even
thousands of “friends.” These “friends” are more than simple lists of names of
potential customers. “Friending” a business or individual grants that business or
individual access to some of one’s personal information, information about his or
her interests and preferences, and perhaps most importantly for a business, contact
information and a built-in means of contact.133
Although an encouraging step, this limited view continues to miss the broader
perspective. The likes and dislikes frequently found on a social media profile have more
significance than simply providing information about those contacts; instead they often become
part of the user’s profile, much of which is visible to the broader audience.134 While in some
circumstances a contact list may indeed meet the criteria required to establish a trade secret, a
social media audience encompasses far more than a simple list of contacts. The focus on trade
secrets misses the essential point about the value of a social media audience, which is found not
by focusing on each individual contact, and placing a monetary value on that particular
relationship. Instead, the value lies in the audience as a whole and the impact it has on the user’s
online persona.135

1293296, at *28 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2014).
See, e.g., Miao, supra note 12, at 1019 (referring to a social media audience as a “subscriber list”); Adam S.
Walker, PhoneDog vs. Kravitz: In the World of Social Media, Who Really Owns What?, 50 PRACTICAL LAW. 49, 49
(June 2012) (referring to a social media audience as “followers”); PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011
WL 5415612, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (referring to Twitter audience as “subscribers” or “followers”).
131

132

See infra Part II.D.

133

Christou, 849 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.

134

Indeed, a visible list of contacts negates the possibility of a trade secret. See McLaughlin, supra note 10, at 106
(“Finding that these user accounts are eligible for trade-secret protection seems entirely antithetical to social media’s
purpose in the workplace. Simply stated, professional networking requires public exposure.”); McNealy, supra note
122, at 50 (“The purpose of social media is to share and consume information. Connections are public, and meant to
be so. A business using an SNS [(social network site)] platform to generate customers does not change the fact that
anyone with an Internet connection can view the business’s list of friends or followers.”) (footnotes omitted).
135

Miao suggests that a list of contacts associated with an online social media account may not rise to the level of a
trade secret because the subscribers themselves choose to remain on the list. See Miao, supra note 12, at 1050; see
also Walker, supra note 131. While interesting, the changing nature of a contact list audience does not necessarily
mean it is incapable of ownership. Other lists that may be a trade secret can easily be unsubscribed to, yet that does
not negate the possibility of ownership.
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2.

Contract

Contract law provides two possible avenues of analysis. First, the Terms of Service agreement
(ToS) between the employee who created the profile and the social media site might provide a
basis for an interference with contract claim, as was the case in Eagle.136 Second, employment
agreements may dictate the disposition of administrative rights when the employment
relationship ends. However, such agreements may be an unlawful restraint of trade, as we
explain in more detail at the end of this subpart.137
Terms of Service agreements govern the relationship between a social media site and its
users. In creating social media accounts, users enter into these agreements individually with the
website. They typically govern how the account can be used, who can use and access the
account, and what content can be posted.138 For example, Facebook and LinkedIn require users
to have personal profiles before creating pages for businesses. The individual user/creator, not
the business he represents, is held responsible under the site’s terms of service.139
When a former employer revokes access to the social media audience cultivated by the
employee, some former employees have sued for tortious interference with contractual relations,
a common law tort arising out of a third party’s intentional interference with a contract
expectancy that leads to damages.140 Under this theory, the employers acted intentionally to
induce a breach of the terms and conditions—and their ensuing rights—vis-à-vis the social
media websites. Employees, however, have thus far not been successful in asserting this tort in
this context. Both Eagle and Mattocks suggest that agents are likely to have a hard time proving
the elements of the tort. In addition to the courts’ reluctance to find in favor of employees
regarding their ToS arguments, their application as a method of resolving disputes fails to
acknowledge the interests involved. ToS agreements are written generically to apply to any user
who creates the account. Social media sites will rarely become involved in disputes over access
to a profile, siding in almost all circumstances with the individual who created the profile,
without regard to whether that might violate a separate employment contract, unless trademark or
copyright violation allegations are involved, as they were in Mattocks. Thus, the application of
ToS, alone, may result in an outcome that is entirely unfair to employers. Furthermore, whether
contract law is, or should be, applicable to determine who is entitled to administrative rights is
certainly questionable.141 As a result, possible employment contracts are likely the better avenue.
However, they too have their limitations.
Clearly, many of the cases discussed herein could have been easily avoided with a clear
136

See supra notes 43, 51–52 and accompanying text.

137

See infra notes 142–147 and accompanying text.
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See User Agreement, supra note 114; Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 114; Statement of Rights and
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See Page Basics, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/281592001947683/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2016);
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 61.
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).

See, e.g., David Horton, Indescendibility, 102 CAL. L. REV. 548, 597 (2014) (“The degree to which courts should
honor adhesive terms is one of the most fraught issues in modern contract law. The problem is the yawning gulf
between contract theory and contract reality: although binding agreements supposedly arise from mutual assent, we
are only dimly aware of the fine print spawned by most commercial transactions. Thus, once in a great while, a
judge will find that a purported form contract is not a contract at all.”) (footnotes omitted).
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employment contract designating the rights to the social media profile. The continued stream of
cases on this matter evidence, at least casually, that such contract provisions are not widely used
in practice, despite the fact that many commentators have recommended their use. 142 However,
those contracts that limit ex-employee access to social media may be unenforceable as an
overbroad restraint of trade.
Recent cases challenging the validity of noncompete and non-solicitation agreements visà-vis social media suggest that courts tend to take an employee-friendly view. Some courts have
held that ex-employee posts announcing new employment or inviting social media audiences to
view a new employer’s website do not violate non-solicitation agreements.143 At least one court
has held that connecting with former clients on Facebook is permissible.144 Even posting a job
opportunity that would likely reach employees that an individual was contractually prohibited
from soliciting does not violate non-solicitation agreements if the post is publicly available.145
One court has even posited that agreements restricting employees from engaging in the above
social media interactions would likely be overly broad and unenforceable.146 McLaughlin argues
that a non-compete agreement requiring an employee to transfer rights to a social media account
when employment ends (a “forced-transfer” provision) may be fundamentally unfair because it
forces an employee into a situation that necessarily requires a breach of contract— either the ToS
or the employment contract.147 “[W]hen employers knowingly induce employees to breach SNS
user agreements, courts should acknowledge the unequal bargaining power between the parties,
and thus equitably prohibit the enforcement of these agreements.”148
Thus, contract law, while it might be applicable and useful in select cases in which the
parties have signed an employment agreement that identifies rights to social media accounts, will
often not provide courts with useful tools to resolve these disputes.
3.

Personal Property

As mentioned above, the relationship between a social media site and its user is governed by the
site’s ToS agreement, which specifically covers whatever property interests may arise through
creation of a social media account. One cannot own a social media account in the traditional
sense of personal property law. As discussed previously, a look at the ToS agreements of three
See Argento, supra note 11, at 226 (“In many cases, parties could avoid disputes by expressly agreeing about
which party has the right to control the social network account. Nevertheless, the default rules remain important
because some parties will inevitably fail to contract around them. Many companies have no employment agreements
for their employees at all, and those that do may fail to address rights to social network accounts. Employment
agreements are particularly prone to omitting important issues because employees’ roles tend to change over time.”)
(footnotes omitted); Hope A. Cominsky & Tracey E. Diamond, The Risks and Rewards of a BYOD Program:
Ensuring Corporate Compliance Without Causing “Bring Your Own Disaster” at Work, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV.
385, 401 (2014). None of the employers in PhoneDog, Eagle, or Maremont had social media policies in place.
142
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See BTS, USA, Inc. v. Exec. Perspectives, LLC, No. X10CV116010685, 2014 WL 6804545, at *12 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 2014); Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc. v. Cahill, 924 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1292 (D. Okla. 2013).
144

Invidia, LLC v. Difonzo, No. MICV20123798H, 2012 WL 5576406, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 2012).
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BTS, 2014 WL 6804545, at *12.
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major social networking platforms—Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn—reveals that none grant
users any type of ownership interest in their accounts.149 Terms of service typically grant
members nothing more than a revocable license to use the site.150 Users do not have rights to
convey, transfer, sell, or use their social media profiles in the same way that traditional property
ownership would imply.
However, in some respects business social media accounts do indeed provide value to the
business with access to customers and potential customers. For instance, as mentioned above,
bankruptcy courts have found that business accounts on social media, including pages for
businesses run by individual employees, are property interests cognizable as intangible assets
under the Bankruptcy Code.151 In In re CTLI, LLC, the bankruptcy court was faced with the
challenge of determining whether a Facebook page was primarily a business or personal asset.152
Alcede, the debtor, contended that the page in question (“Tactical Firearms”) was distinguished
from his personal profile and another page he created called “Jeremy Alcede Patriot.” 153 Like
Kravitz, Eagle, and Maremont, Alcede argued that the page’s followers reflected the relationship
with an audience he had developed, thus earning him a stake in the page based on the goodwill
that had accrued to the account.154
Even though Alcede wrote posts in the first person and changed the name of the page, the
court found that its primary use as a forum to promote the business was persuasive evidence the
page was a business page.155 However, the court made an important distinction, attempting to
disentangle professional goodwill from business goodwill. Recognizing that business goodwill is
developed by employees of the business over time, the court stated that professional goodwill
was that amount of goodwill that is withdrawn when the individual leaves the business; whatever
remains is business goodwill, an intangible asset that rightfully accrues to the business and
remains with it when the employee leaves.156 Employees are entitled only to professional
goodwill, which the court identified as embodied in the ability of Facebook followers of the

149

See User Agreement, supra note 114; Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 114; Mazzone, supra note 115, at
1648–49.
150

See Jamie Patrick Hopkins & Ilya Alexander Lipin, Viable Solutions to the Digital Estate Planning Dilemma, 99
IOWA L. REV. BULL. 61, 66–67 (2014); Sally Brown Richardson, How Community Property Jurisdictions Can Avoid
Being Lost in Cyberspace, 72 LA. L. REV. 89, 111 (2011) (“Twitter accounts, though creating property rights, are not
owned. The tweeter-wife who creates the Twitter account during the marriage has a license to use the account;
Twitter remains the owner of the actual Twitter service.”); John Conner, Comment, Digital Life After Death: The
Issue of Planning for a Person’s Digital Assets After Death, 3 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 301, 306–07
(2011); Whitfield, supra note 113, at 868 (“From an intellectual property and a contractual perspective, actual user
accounts offered by social-network sites appear to be the exclusive property of the sites, rather than the property of
employee or employer users.”).
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See In re CTLI, LLC, 528 B.R. 359, 359 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015); In re Borders Grp., No. 11-10614 (MG), 2011
WL 5520261, at *13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011).
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Tactical Firearms page to follow Alcede to his personal Jeremy Alcede Patriot page.157
On the other hand, in Eagle, the plaintiff sought the right to control her social media
profile by suing for identity theft and conversion. The court expressed discomfort in applying
property-related theories to social media and denied her claim for identity theft, finding that her
name was publicly available and therefore not unlawfully possessed. 158 The Eagle court also
denied the claim of conversion, noting that intangible property, such as software, domain names
and “an intangible right to access a specific page on a computer” cannot be subject to a
conversion claim.159 Although some commentators have advocated for intangible items such as
digital assets to be considered personal property, 160 current case law does not suggest any
movement in that direction.161
4.

Privacy

A sudden disconnection from one’s group or an unwanted association (or disassociation) with a
former employer can provoke feelings of intrusion, embarrassment, and anxiety. Such actions
may also have economic and professional repercussions. For these reasons, former employees
often allege violation of privacy in attempting to regain control over their social media and
digital selves. However, courts have floundered in their approaches to privacy online, resulting in
disparate results. For instance, the plaintiff in Eagle prevailed on her privacy cause of action yet
the court did not award her damages.162 The Maremont court held that the plaintiff had provided
no evidence to support her claim that the defendant employer had intruded upon her seclusion by
accessing her social media accounts without consent.163
Generally, nothing is private on social media. The Supreme Court “consistently has held
that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to
third parties.”164 Since sharing and interaction are the premises of social media, proving privacy
157

Id. at 373–74.

158

Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013).
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Id. at *10.

Argento, supra note 11, at 274 (“In general, the law appears to be moving in the direction of finding intangible
items such as domain names and phone numbers to be personal property and subject to conversion[;]” noting some
cases that have found domain names and phone numbers to be personal property). See also Horton, supra note 141,
at 568; Susan Eisenberg, Note, Intangible Takings, 60 VAND. L. REV. 667, 696 (2007) (arguing in favor of
recognition of a “new class of virtual property” which would include web sites, screen names, email addresses, etc.).
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See, e.g., Eagle, 2013 WL 943350, at *10; Giordano v. Claudio, 714 F. Supp. 2d 508, 524 (E.D. Pa. 2010);
Apparel Bus. Sys., LLC v. Tom James Co., No. 06–1092, 2008 WL 858754, at *18–19 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28,
2008) (“Software is not the kind of property subject to a conversion claim. . . .”); DirecTV, Inc. v. Frick, No. Civ.A.
03-6045, 2004 WL 438663, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2004) (finding that satellite signals constitute intangible
property which cannot be converted under Pennsylvania law); Famology.com Inc. v. Perot Sys. Corp., 158 F. Supp.
2d 589, 591 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that domain names are not the type of tangible property that may be
converted).
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in this realm is difficult, if not impossible, under current interpretations of law.165 Sharing photos
even on the most restrictive of privacy settings does not guarantee privacy, no matter what
personal entitlement the person may hold. In United States v. Meregildo,166 the defendant only
allowed his profile to be viewed by his friends, not an extended network of friends of friends, or
publicly. Despite these settings, the court held that Meregildo had no justifiable expectation that
his Facebook friends would keep his profile private and dissemination of information on his
profile by his friends was legal.167 Even a minor does not have an expectation of privacy on
social media.168 When seventeen-year-old Chelsea Chaney’s bikini-clad Facebook photo was
used in a school presentation about Internet safety, the court found she had no reasonable
expectation of privacy when she shared the photo with the broadest possible audience on her
profile.169
As the vast majority of relevant cases make clear, a social media audience, and its close
connection with the user’s profile, will not likely be deemed private.170 Moreover, even if the
right to privacy has been violated, plaintiffs may still have difficulty proving damage. 171
The sheer variety of claims and the courts’ hesitant approaches to resolving them may be
evidence of a lack of understanding of the nature and exercise that these employees performed
on social media. Thus, before determining how the law should address post-employment social
medial audience retention, a critical examination of the act of social media audience management
is required. The following part examines social media, with an eye toward unraveling the nature
of the plaintiffs’ purported harms, and ultimately, lending support to the application of a new
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating in dicta that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill
suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the
course of carrying out mundane tasks.”) (citations omitted).
165
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violation of due process clause and no unreasonable search and seizure when a high school used a student’s semiprivate Facebook photo in a county-wide seminar without the student’s knowledge or consent).
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corresponding right to privacy, at least as applicable under the SCA; further holding, however, that once possibly
private Facebook information was shared by a friend, its access by the employer did not violate the SCA because it
was not unauthorized).
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Monitoring, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 285, 289–90 (2011); Allyson W. Haynes, Virtual Blinds: Finding Online Privacy in
Offline Precedents, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 603, 638 (2012); Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and
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See supra text accompanying notes 53–54, 78; McLaughlin, supra note 10, at 104 (“Although some privacy
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legal framework.

II.

CONCEPTUALIZING THE VALUE AND EXERCISE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

One reason the law is so muddled is because courts and lawmakers battle with conceptualizations
of the nature and value of a social media presence.172 Is a social media audience like an oldfashioned Rolodex or database listing a series of contacts? Or is it more like a corporate business
card? Could it ever be as labor-intensive as an advertising campaign or as private as a secret recipe?
Evidence of the struggle in understanding social media abounds in the four representative cases
above: PhoneDog wondered whether a password could be a trade secret; the Eagle court pondered
whether a company could keep a former employee’s LinkedIn account; the judge in Maremont
had to decide whether it was reasonable for an employer to continue marketing via an absent
employee’s Facebook account; and in Mattocks, the court had to determine whether a “like” was
a verifiable business interest. These are ultimately normative questions whose answers rest not
only in interpretations of applicable law, but in accurate characterizations of a digital environment
that did not exist a decade ago.
What follows are five tenets that describe the process, the reality, and ultimately the
value, of social media audience management. While individuals engage in social media for
varied purposes, we focus narrowly on the case where employees promote their employers
through social media. For ease of reference, we refer to the employee directing and managing the
social media site as the “manager.” It is the common act of online socialization, and its resultant
relationships, that form the essence of this analysis.
A.

Through Its Rules and Architecture, Each Website Provides Context, Norms, and
Culture for Social Media Interaction

Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn—all founded between 2002 and 2006173—are the dominant
social media platforms in the United States.174 The terms and conditions of the three sites are
similar. None grants users any ownership interest in the accounts themselves. 175 Users of all
See McLaughlin, supra note 10, at 100 (“The [Eagle] court’s comparison of social media to dissimilar
technologies shows the inherent challenges associated with the application of archaic doctrines to novel
innovation.”).
172
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See Phillips, supra note 3; Arthur, supra note 3; A Brief History of LinkedIn, supra note 3.

174

Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn are three of the five most popular social media sites according to a survey by
the Pew Research Center. Maeve Duggan et al., Social Media Update 2014, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 9, 2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/01/09/social-media-update-2014/. Facebook is the most widely used with seventyone percent of internet users over eighteen signed up as members. Id. The other two platforms—Pinterest and
Instagram—differ from the aforementioned sites in that the two are photo-sharing sites where the only dialogue
between users occurs in comments of photos users upload. Id.
175

LinkedIn and Twitter provide the most explicit statements negating any possibility of ownership. Section 2.4 of
the LinkedIn User Agreement, titled “Your Membership,” states that “[t]he profile you create on LinkedIn . . . will
become part of LinkedIn and except for the content and information that you license to us is owned by LinkedIn.
However, between you and others, your account belongs to you.” User Agreement, supra note 114 (emphasis
added). See also Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 114; Mazzone, supra note 115, at 1648 (“Facebook’s terms of
use (called ‘Statement of Rights and Responsibilities’”), to which every user must agree in accessing the Facebook
site, do not specifically state that Facebook retains ownership of individual Facebook accounts. Nonetheless, several
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three sites are the sole owners of the content posted on their profiles.176
Facebook is an “online social network where members develop personalized web profiles
to interact and share information with other members.”177 Individuals can create both personal
profiles and pages about themselves or others.178 Profiles and pages can include multimedia,
news articles, and personal updates.179 Facebook users generally have control over their visibility
settings and can set their profiles to be public or visible only to the user’s “friends.” 180 Users see
their friends’ activity in their “News Feed” on the Facebook home page. 181 “Likes” are “a way
for Facebook users to share information with each other” and convey enjoyment or approval
without leaving a textual comment.182 When users “like” content posted on a profile or page,
they become connected with it.183 Once connected, users will see content from that profile or
page in their news feed, the page will appear on their profile, and the user will appear on the
page as someone who likes that page, as an association or implicit endorsement.184
In contrast to Facebook’s emphasis on the personal, LinkedIn distinguishes itself as a site
for individuals to network in a professional capacity. Individuals with whom a user is “linked”
see updates to the individual’s profile (depending on the individual’s notification settings). 185 In
keeping with its business-networking culture, LinkedIn profiles have sections for education,
associations, honors and awards.186 LinkedIn users may only maintain one account at a time and
may set up company pages only as authorized representatives.187
key provisions make clear that, according to Facebook, accounts are not property owned by individual users. For
one thing, Facebook imposes numerous restrictions on how a Facebook account can be used. Users who violate the
‘letter or spirit’ of Facebook’s terms lose access to the site. Thus, what Facebook users possess is the ability to
access the Facebook site via an account so long as they comply with Facebook’s terms.”) (footnotes omitted).
176

User Agreement, supra note 114, § 3.1; Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 114, § 4; Statement of Rights and
Responsibilities, supra note 61, § 2.
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FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/110920455663362 (last visited Mar. 15, 2016).
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See id. LinkedIn requires that users who make company profiles have a full profile for over a week, have several
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LINKEDIN (Jan. 30, 2015), https://help.linkedin.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/1594/ft/eng.
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Twitter differs greatly from Facebook and LinkedIn because it is not a profile-based
network. Its default setting allows users to freely follow each other without prior notice or
approval. Users can see the “tweets,” 140 character messages that can include a photo or video, of
all the accounts they follow.188 Users can also mention each other in tweets using “@” and the
username of another189 and hashtags (“#”) to tag topics.190 Individuals can create accounts with
any username they desire that is not already in use, 191 but the site offers a verification option to
“establish authenticity of identities of key individuals and brands on Twitter.” 192
B. The Social Media Manager Is Spokesperson, Author, and Relationship Administrator
In most instances, a business’s primary goal in maintaining an online social media presence is to
communicate and build relationships with a large assembly of consumers and constituents,
thereby strengthening brand reputation and recognition. The employee charged with maintaining
the profile (Twitter feed or Facebook page) may be acting in the capacity of a representative of
the employer. Unlike a traditional spokesperson reading from a well-vetted script, the employee
must infuse personality into the social media so as to anthropomorphize the company,
communicating in a way that creates and sustains relationships.193
In the world of social media, where many compete for attention, it is well recognized that
“accounts don’t really work unless they have a touch of personality. Tweeted press releases
aren’t interesting on Twitter; personal wit is regarded above all, and encouraged at every smart
firm with a social media presence.”194 As such, to be successful, the social media manager must
entertain as well as inform, add value as well as perform. Unlike the traditional author, his
written work is published and judged instantaneously; his agility with words, prized. He must
also be responsive, reactive, and up-to-date. Ultimately, the objective is to create a relationship
with the audience through the persona presented.
Given these varied roles, the process is time-consuming and requires a great deal of
effort. One business blogger compared the demands of social media on a business to a hungry
baby requiring feeding on a very regular basis.195 Audience management requires understanding
188
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2016).
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See In re CTLI, LLC, 528 B.R. at 366; Using Hashtags on Twitter, TWITTER,
https://support.twitter.com/articles/49309 (last visited Mar. 15, 2016).
See Why Can’t I Register Certain Usernames?, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/101299 (last visited
Mar. 15, 2016).
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FAQs about Verified Accounts, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/111features/articles/119135-about-verified-accounts (last visited Mar. 15, 2016). Users in areas such as “music, acting,
fashion, government, politics, religion, journalism, media, sports, [and] business” can apply for verification of their
accounts. Id.
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Michael Fertik, Is Social Media Worth It for Small Businesses?, FORBES (Aug. 21, 2014, 1:05 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelfertik/2014/08/21/is-social-media-worth-it-for-small-businesses/.
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the audience, planning content, and “constant, ubiquitous engagement.”196 Managers must
remember identities and connections of individuals in the network and what information has
been exchanged, and when.197 Some companies have been forced to dedicate full-time
employees solely to manage social media.198 According to one study, many business owners and
senior executives spend over four hours per day on social media.199 Because of the time, labor,
and personality put in to this effort, one scholar called losing a profile a “harsh blow.” 200
D.C.

The Social Media Audience Is Interactive and Highly Dynamic

Social media scholars Alice Marwick and danah boyd have proposed that the medium has
changed the relationship between the audience and the broadcaster.201 The traditional broadcast
audience, comprised of a single broadcaster communicating with nonresponsive observers, has
evolved into a highly interactive “networked audience.”202 In radio or television broadcasts, oneway content is institutionally created and directed at a passive audience of consumers. A
networked audience, on the other hand, is active and connected.203 Social media allows for
participants to both send and receive information in an interactive manner.204 Audience members
participate in the creation of content by adding comments, posting photos, liking, sharing, or
“retweeting” posts and comments provided by others.
As a result of this constant interaction, the social media manager is not only a content
producer, but also a mediator of the evolving content and relationships that emerge. Social media
audiences influence the content an individual produces, and affect how the manager crafts her
evolving image. In other words, the audience becomes part of the process of constructing a social
media persona.205 A social media audience becomes so closely tied to the user’s persona that the
Dorie Clark, It’s Time to Cut Back on Social Media, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 23, 2013),
https://hbr.org/2013/01/why-2013-is-the-year-to-cut-ba.
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two cannot be separated. It is also highly fluid, changing constantly as individuals and content
are added or removed.206
E.D.

The Social Media Manager Often Works Across Personal and Professional Contexts

Social media renders the line between the professional and personal undeniably blurry. Social
media users manage multiple audiences from different life contexts (childhood friends,
professional contacts, family, etc.) in a single online platform for varied reasons. Given the
unwieldiness and time-consuming nature of managing multiple social media profiles, some
choose to consolidate into a single profile or site for efficiency or convenience. Additionally, the
very structure or terms of the sites may force users to intermingle audiences.207
For the avid social media audience manager aiming to broaden his social media presence,
this amalgamation may prove useful as it increases his followers, activity, and reach. On the
other hand, the erasure of the fine distinctions among audiences may result in what has been
referred to as “context collapse.”208 Context collapse involves the forced merging of social and
professional contexts, making the individual unable to differentiate self-presentation online.209
As a result, some users may adjust their behavior “so as to make it appropriate for a variety of
different situations and audiences;”210 others may simply suffer the social repercussions that
ensue from dissonant self-presentations.
In addition, employees may intentionally meld personal contacts to increase visibility and
networking ability, or may import contacts accumulated prior to their current efforts on behalf of
an employer. For example, in the Mattocks case, prior to employment, Mattocks had personally
created and managed a fan page devoted to a BET show. Upon joining BET’s marketing effort,
she amalgamated her prior fan base (amounting to 2 million likes) to her work for BET. 211 The
result was a highly successful fan page with ambiguous ownership, which BET ultimately took
as its own.
F.E.

A Social Media Audience Has Social and Financial Value

A social media audience carries value in terms of social currency, reputation, and personal

Alice Marwick & Nicole B. Ellison, “There Isn’t Wifi in Heaven!” Negotiating Visibility on Facebook Memorial
Pages, 56 J. BROADCASTING & E LECTRONIC MEDIA 378, 378 (2012) (“Social media such as Facebook make
possible future audiences that may not be anticipated by the participants.”).
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brand.212 Interaction with social media audiences can result in social and dignitary benefits for the
individual collector. On a basic level, the individual may experience the relational welfare
stemming from strengthened individual bonds and fulfillment at being at the nucleus of a
networked group.
Both the social media manager and the business he promotes can also gain significant
social capital and business goodwill from a wide, heterogeneous audience.213 Research
conducted by Bain & Company found that customers who engage businesses on social media
spend twenty percent to forty percent more with those businesses than other customers and feel
greater loyalty to the businesses with which they connect.214 Other sources have calculated the
potential value to the business sector from effective use of social networks to between $900
billion and $1.3 trillion a year. 215As Marwick observes, upgrading social status through
popularity and influence often drives online participation.216 Acknowledging this need, most
social networking sites employ indicators of status and importance, such as Facebook “likes” and
Twitter “retweets.”217 Researchers have noted that individuals with an online influence can
benefit from resources such as access to useful information, access to individuals outside their
own circle, and elevated social status.218 For the individual, this creates professional goodwill,
which can result in concrete benefits such as business and employment connections.219
Businesses enjoy their own distinct advantages. Enhanced relationships with a broad network of
consumers can strengthen reputation, engage current and future customers, and generate profit.
Google Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt refers to online identity as both “commodity”
and “currency.”220 He suggests that in the future, “[i]dentity will be the most valuable
commodity for citizens . . . and it will exist primarily online. . . . We are what we tweet.” 221 For
212
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eds., 2009) [hereinafter Quantifying Users’ Interconnectedness]; Martin Gneiser et al., Valuation of Online Social
Networks Taking into Account Users’ Interconnectedness, 10 INFO. SYS. & E-BUS. MGMT. 61, (2012) [hereinafter
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all of the reasons outlined in the preceding paragraphs, there is ample evidence that the future
Schmidt envisions of online identity as a commodity is close, if not here. Marketing strategies
once reserved for companies are being applied to individuals. An entire industry has developed
around self-branding—assisting individuals in creating a successful identity with which to
market themselves widely. 222
Further evidencing the rising value of online identity, social media has led to the
democratization of celebrity. Scholars have loosely defined fame as “the informal attribution of
distinction on an individual within a given social network.”223 In the twentieth century,
businesses began to manufacture individuals’ fame as a commodity that was leveraged for
profit.224 Few could attain the level of notoriety that would result in an identity with commercial
value.
Today, social media has changed the dynamic of the manufacturing and distribution of
celebrity, facilitating a phenomenon known as “micro-celebrity.” Micro-celebrity is “the
phenomenon of being extremely well known not to millions but to a small group,” a few
thousand or even a few dozen people.225 Micro-celebrity, like self-branding, is a construction of
identity that can be consumed by others with the audience acting as a fan base.226 This identity
draws a fan base that can be used to promote one’s self and monetized through sponsored
promotions.227 Internet scholars have noted that the concept of micro-celebrity “implies that all
individuals have an audience that they can strategically maintain through ongoing
communication and interaction.”228
Anecdotes abound of people promoting themselves through social media, garnering a
following, and translating that self-made fame into lucrative careers.229 One commentator has
observed that this path to success has become “well-trodden.”230 For example, Michelle Phan, a
YouTube blogger known for her homemade make-up instruction videos, launched a commercial
empire that includes her own line of makeup, a music label, and a lifestyle site.231
Despite Schmidt’s statements and conventional wisdom about the value of identity, some
courts and commentators have struggled with attaching value to online identity and social media
222
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audiences.232 Linda Eagle’s former employer locked her out of her LinkedIn account, causing
search results for her name to be redirected to her successor’s page. Although the court held in
her favor, it did not award her damages because it held that she could not prove a loss of
value.233 Some courts have refused to attach value to what they view as an indeterminate
reputational matter or an impermanent asset.234 In other words, since social media platforms
allow members to unilaterally disconnect from the networked group at any time, some have
argued that it is a non-static list incapable of ownership and assessable value.235
Interestingly, however, both bankruptcy courts and the financial industry have recognized
the value of social media presence and audiences, no matter now changeable or intangible. The
recent bankruptcy cases discussed previously in Part I involving the ownership and valuation of
social media profiles conclude that the administrative privileges and associated digital rights are
bona fide assets and business goodwill.236 The Maremont court also recognized value in the
plaintiff’s Twitter and Facebook followers, noting that they were “a marketable commercial
interest.”237
Well-established financial standards and metrics also quantify the value of networked
audiences. For instance, some general valuation models divide the number of users on a platform
by the company’s valuation to determine the monetary value of each user.238 PhoneDog, in its
case against Kravitz, argued that industry standards valued each Twitter follower at $2.50 per
month.239 Other valuation metrics capture factors such as relationships between users,
connections of users, and loyalty of users, rather than just numbers. 240
With an understanding of the many claims involved and the burgeoning meaning and
value of social media audiences in firmer grasp, the next part proposes that publicity rights, a
hybrid of privacy and property law, is an appropriate lens through which to analyze the harm that
employees suffer when their digital identities and work product are usurped.
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USING PUBLICITY RIGHTS RATIONALE TO DETERMINE POSTEMPLOYMENT SOCIAL MEDIA CONTROL

As we have shown above, courts have had difficulty resolving employment cases involving
social media retention and balancing competing interests.241 They have analyzed the issues
through the lenses of trade secret, personal property, privacy, and intellectual property rights to
little avail. Given that social media is laborious, creative, and often tied to its manager’s
personality, this section argues that the law of publicity rights offers a fuller, more accurate
foundation for the analysis of the post-employment control of social media accounts. As a wellestablished quasi-property claim in identity, publicity rights protect the economic fruit of a
person’s name and identity. Justified in publicity rights, we contend that individuals should be
entitled to protection against those who seek to misappropriate their work, personae, and
goodwill for economic gain, except when their work falls squarely in the scope of their
employment. However, as discussed in Part II, disentangling the personal from the professional
and defining the scope of employment requires surgical precision in the modern world. As such,
we propose a framework for application of publicity rights to this novel employment context.
Inspired by the precepts of agency and publicity law, our proposed rubric balances the
employee’s financial, social, and emotional interests in his social media while balancing the
employer’s legitimate business claims.
A.

Applying Publicity Rights to Social Media Personae

The right of publicity is a relatively new quasi-property right that grew out of the privacy tort of
commercial appropriation.242 Historically, an appropriation claim sought recovery for the
dignitary and emotional harms that result from unauthorized appropriation of a person’s
likeness.243 However, as the practice of celebrity endorsements in advertising grew in the latter
half of the twentieth century, it became clear that the identity of public figures carried
commercial value—apart from the privacy interests protected by the appropriation tort.244 An
early seminal New York case involved the unauthorized use of the images of major league
baseball players in baseball cards.245 The Second Circuit found—for the first time—that
individuals had a property right in their own images.246
Celebrities clamored for the protection of this intangible asset, which could not be
241
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justified in privacy alone.247 One argument that was particularly persuasive in favor of the new
tort was that the time and effort that celebrities invested in themselves carried a real, protectable
value.248 As a result, a handful of states led the emergence of a new tort, the right of publicity,
which takes a property-based view of the right to one’s likeness, persona, and reputation.249
Scholars have extensively debated the tort’s theoretical underpinnings. 250 What justifies the
prevention of the unauthorized commercial appropriation of a valuable persona? One common
moral justification for the right centers upon Lockean labor considerations: the person who puts
time and energy into creating value in his image is justified in owning the fruit of his labor,
reaping its benefits, and preventing others from unjustly enriching from it. 251 Economic
rationales for the right are utilitarian in nature, as economic incentives promote creativity and
progress and protect consumers from deception.252 Others point to the importance of individual
dignity and autonomy as the driving force for publicity rights.253 Theories of personhood and
autonomy justify publicity rights based upon the inherent link between the self and a person’s
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right to control its presentation.254
Today, over thirty states recognize publicity rights, either through common law255 or by
256
statute. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition sets forth the four elements of a right
of publicity claim. A claimant must show that (1) the defendant used the plaintiff’s identity (2)
for the defendant’s commercial (or other) advantage (3) without the plaintiff’s consent, (4)
causing injury.257
Over the past forty years, the right of publicity has experienced a significant expansion.
Traditionally, courts had held that only name and likeness were the proper indicia of identity to
support a right of publicity claim.258 However, over the years, jurisdictions, led by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, expanded the indicia of identity to recognize a broader concept of
identity, such as “name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness.”259 One famous case held that
the mere evocation of a person’s signature role as a game show model violated her publicity
rights.260
Given the justifications and the expanded scope of the modern right of publicity, its
application to social media is logical. Outside of the employment context, various scholars have
made this argument persuasively. 261 A social media profile can be an extension of its creator’s

254

Id. at 822–23.

255

Nemet-Nejat, supra note 205, at 117 (eleven states have developed the tort via the common law).

256

At least nineteen states have enacted some form of a right of publicity statute, including: California (CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3344 (West 2016)), Florida (FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2016)), Illinois (765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075 (2016)),
Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (West 2016)), Indiana (IND. CODE § 32-36-1 (2016)), Massachusetts
(MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § 3A (2016)), Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-211 (2016)), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 52-597 (2016)), New York (N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 2016)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2741 (LexisNexis 2016)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 25 (2016)), Pennsylvania (42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8316
(2016)), Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.1 (2016)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104 (2016)),
Texas (TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26 (West 2015)), Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-3 (LexisNexis 2015)), Virginia
(using a person’s name or picture for a commercial purpose without authorization: VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-216.1
(2015); misappropriation: VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (2015)), Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60 (2015)), and
Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 995.50 (2015)).
257

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). Although the Restatement
definition applies in many of these states that recognize the right, its application and interpretation remains
“decidedly varied.” Nemet-Nejat, supra note 205, at 116–18. Some states, such as New York, recognize a cause of
action only when one’s name or likeness has been used in advertising. Id. at 117. Other states take a broader
approach. California law is much friendlier to celebrities, adopting an expansive approach by allowing claims for
various indicia of identity such as tone of voice and other distinctive characteristics. Id.
David Tan, Much Ado About Evocation: A Cultural Analysis of “Well-Knownness” and the Right of Publicity, 28
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 317, 321 (2010) (“The classic definition of identity in a common law claim is usually
‘name and likeness.’”); see also Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983),
superseded by statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2016); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal.
1979), superseded by statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2016).
258

Tan, supra note 258, at 321, 329 (“The circuit decisions for the state of California have expanded the meaning of
identity in a common law publicity claim beyond ‘name and likeness’ to include virtually any attribute associated
with a celebrity individual.”); see, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992); Waits v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
259

White, 971 F.2d at 1399 (holding that Samsung’s advertisement depicting a robot that evoked the style and role
of a recognizable game show hostess was a violation of her right to publicity).
260

261

Recent scholarship proposes the application of the right of publicity to online identities. For instance, William

34

Vol. 53 / American Business Law Journal

persona and will likely include indicia of identity such as name and likeness, as demonstrated by
the four social media cases discussed earlier. Like traditional celebrities, these employees put in
considerable time and effort in their personae. Like the historical justification for granting
celebrities publicity rights, there is economic value in their work, their reputations, and their
following.262 From a Lockean perspective, they should enjoy the fruits of their labor, which, as
established above, is quite intensive and encompassing in its dynamism. In their capacity as
thought-disseminators, social media managers may also carry high endorsement value with their
trusted audiences. The plaintiffs in PhoneDog, Maremont, and Mattocks each made their living
by sharing their opinions and endorsements in a signature style. Their audiences followed them,
seeking out their particular expertise and musings. There is little doubt in the business world that
the plaintiffs’ actions carried value. In fact, the four employers’ actions (in usurping the social
media post-employment) are a recognition of this value. However, both Eagle and Maremont
failed to remunerate the wronged employees based on their right to publicity. While it
acknowledged that Eagle had made a prima facie showing of publicity rights, the Eagle court had
trouble with the concept that the temporary hijacking of the employee’s LinkedIn could have
caused damage—and in fact sought proof that actual damage had occurred.263 The Maremont
court concluded that the employer’s act of communicating through an employee’s Facebook
page without her consent was not an unjust appropriation of her identity.
While the majority of courts today recognize that publicity rights are available to all
individuals (regardless of their fame), they often struggle conceptualizing of value of the rights
of non-traditional celebrities or nonpublic figures. 264 As more nonpublic individuals garner
personality value through their social media efforts, we will likely see more such cases. These
cases illustrate the need for a clear rubric to apply publicity rights in the context of social media
employment cases.
B.

The Employee’s Persona Versus the Employer’s Asset: A Multi-Factor Analysis for
Determining Post-Employment Retention of Social Media

As mentioned above, the four elements of a right of publicity claim are that (1) the defendant
used the plaintiff’s identity (2) for the defendant’s commercial (or other) advantage (3) without

McGeveran advocates a “persona rights” paradigm for digital identities, based on a combination of privacy and
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persona.
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the plaintiff’s consent, (4) causing injury. 265 In the employment context, it is clear that employers
often have the right—whether implicit or explicit—to use their employees’ identities for their
commercial advantage. However, the world of social medial is replete with blurred boundaries
and context collapse.266 More than ever employees mix contacts, worlds, and behavior,
sometimes resulting in a lack of clarity regarding whether the employer used the employee’s
identity wrongfully, without his consent, and caused injury.
The following five-part analysis is intended to provide specific factors that courts could
consider to determine the proper post-employment fate of a mixed-use social media account. The
rubric is structured with five overarching themes, each undergirded by a series of questions. The
themes to examine are: (1) the purpose and nature of the employment relationship; (2) the
purpose and nature of the social media account, including its creation; (3) the employer’s access
or control of the social media account; (4) the degree to which the employee’s persona is infused
in the forum; and (5) the injury caused by the employer’s alleged infringement. We address each
theme and factor in detail below.267
1.

Employment Purpose and Relationship

An analysis to determine administrative rights to a social media profile and audience begins by
looking at the reasons for which the employee was hired and the nature of the employee’s job.
Thus, if an employee was hired for a marketing or communications-related post, or was primarily
responsible for creating and maintaining social media relationships for the employer, these facts
would weigh in favor of employer retention. A court should ask whether building or maintaining
a social media audience on behalf of the employer was a critical part of the employee’s job
description. In PhoneDog v. Kravitz, the employee was hired to be a video blogger, reviewing
products and sharing his views on Twitter.268 Although the employee eventually became a microcelebrity to his followers, this factor would weigh heavily against his continued retention and
control of the social media.
On the other hand, if the creation of a social media audience was not part of the
employee’s work duties, and the employee used a primarily personal social media account to
promote the employer’s business only occasionally, those facts would indicate that the employer
did not have the automatic right to use the employee’s identity—and administrative rights would
rightfully belong to the employee. In Eagle v. Morgan, an education executive sued for the return
of her social media after it was hijacked by her former company.269 The executive’s employment
was not premised or contingent on her social media involvement, nor was social media
interaction her obligation; hence, this factor would weigh in her favor.
Thus, questions courts might consider under this first prong include:

Was building or maintaining a social media presence on behalf of the employer a
critical part of the employee’s job description? Alternatively, did the employee
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2.

promote the company on social media as a secondary consideration or out of
loyalty to the employer?
Was the employee hired for a marketing or communications-related post?
Was the employee hired with the understanding that she would contribute or
import her existing social media presence to the company?

Purpose and Nature of the Social Media Account

Courts should also consider the purpose and nature of the account, including the facts
surrounding its creation. This analysis first considers whether the employee or the employer
created the account. If the employee’s job required maintenance of an account that had been set
up before employment began, that would weigh in favor of the employer’s continued right to the
audience associated with it. Similarly, if an employee’s existing account(s) and social media
audience were important factors in her hiring, and the employee brought a majority of the social
media audience with her when she began working for the employer, then the presumption would
be that the employee is entitled to keep the administrative rights to the profile and its associated
audience when employment ends.
If the employee created the account after becoming employed, then courts must carefully
consider the circumstances surrounding its creation, including who set up the account and whose
name is associated with it. Employees who create social media profiles on their own behalves
unrelated to their job description have a stronger claim to the account. Timing and location may
also be factors. An employee who creates an account during employment may be considered to
be acting as an agent for the employer, and thus could have a weaker claim to the associated
audience when she leaves. On the other hand, if the employee created the account on her own,
this may be indicative that the employee should retain access rights.270 For instance, in the
PhoneDog case, Kravitz claimed “that he created the account on his own initiative to promote his
freelance work, including the freelance work he was doing for PhoneDog.” 271 If such facts are
true, this presumption should apply particularly if the account was used primarily for personal
reasons.272
The name and e-mail account officially associated with the account is also an important
factor. If the account is set up in the employee’s name only, as was Linda Eagle’s,273 the
presumption should be that the account remains within the employee’s control. In Maremont, the
270
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fact that the employee had set up the account under her name won the day for the employee, who
was the victor.274
Facebook in particular provides settings that allow users to keep information private,
including friend lists.275 However, the default setting is that “everyone” can see the friends
associated with a particular account.276 Thus, if an employee creates and maintains an account in
his own name, and affirmatively changes the privacy settings so that public viewing is restricted,
and the employer has no access to the account to change these settings or see private posts, this
would weigh in the employee’s favor.
In addition to the circumstances surrounding the creation of the account, the type and
nature of the account at issue is also relevant, as it can indicate the intentions of its creator.277 A
personal timeline on Facebook displays an individual’s identity and stands in contrast to a
Facebook page which represents businesses, organizations, or a celebrity’s public profile. The
creation of a personal timeline may therefore indicate a personal rather than professional focus to
the user’s account. LinkedIn provides personal accounts, group pages, and also an option for
corporate accounts that are managed by one particular person.278 However, LinkedIn tends to be
used more for business-related purposes, while Twitter and Facebook accounts are often highly
personal.279 Courts must have the ability to properly distinguish between these various options in
context.
Thus, questions courts might consider under this second prong include:

Why was the social media forum created?

Did the employee create the social media profile in question? If so, on whose
behalf? Or alternatively, did the employee inherit the forum?

Is the social media forum predominantly personal or job-related in nature?

What are the privacy settings on the account?

What is the prevalent purpose of the social media platform (e.g., personal or
business) and its particular format (Profile, fan page, TimeLine, etc.)?

Did the employee bring the majority of the social media audience with him when
he began working for the employer?
3.

Employer Access and Control

Employer access and control of the social media accounts is a third significant element in the
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analysis. Here, courts will look at the level of authority the employer maintains over the accounts
in question. If part of the employee’s job was to cultivate a social media audience, did the
employer give guidance as to that presence? Did the employer openly monitor or control the
subject forum and postings? The answers to these questions relate to whether maintenance of the
account in question was part of the employee’s job duties and are closely related to the first two
factors. An employer who requires the employee to create a Facebook account, for instance, may
be more likely to impose rules on the maintenance of that account.
Courts should also consider who has access to the account and passwords. An employer
who has insisted on having administrative rights or maintaining control of the social media
accounts or their login information would have a strong argument that the accounts are primarily
work-related.280 For example, in the Mattocks case, the employee was hired for her social media
presence and skill in promoting a BET show on Facebook. 281 Upon her employment, she
consented to allowing her employer administrative rights to the fan page over which she
previously had sole control.282 This act evidences clear consent and weighs in favor of the cable
network. If more than one employee worked on an account, it is likely that the parties did not
contemplate that any one employee would have an exclusive right to the account, but if only one
employee managed the account this may favor the employee.283
Thus, questions courts might consider under this third prong include:

Did the employer require employees to maintain and cultivate a social media
audience?

Did the employer give guidance as to the employee’s social media presence?

Did the employer monitor or control the subject forum and postings?

Did the employer impose rules regarding the subject social media account?

Did the employer legitimately have administrative rights or password
information?

Did more than one employee have access to edit and change the account?
4.

Employee Persona

280
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Employees should have a strong claim to social media they created and infused with their own
identity and for the purposes of socialization or personal networking. This factor in the analysis
requires a close look at the employee’s online persona and presence. As mentioned above, many
social media audiences are amassed largely through a person’s individual expressions of
personality, wit, expertise, or flair.284 The stronger the employee’s online identity or indicia of
identity, the greater should be the presumption that the employee is entitled to retention.
Reflective of publicity rights, this presumption reflects the value of the employee’s online
persona and prevents the employer from trading on or misappropriating the employee’s identity.
Thus, questions courts might consider under this fourth prong include:

Does the social media forum identify the employee by name?

Is the forum infused with the personality and identity of the employee? Was it
representative of the individual?

Did the employee enjoy social media recognition or notoriety independent of the
employer?

Did the employee write or create the majority of his or her own content?

Did the employee amass the social media audience under his or her own name or
was he or she writing anonymously or pseudonymously on behalf of the
employer?
Employees who attract social media audiences through a variety of accounts have a
particularly persuasive argument for publicity rights.
5.

Degree of Injury

Finally, if courts are to apply publicity rights to remedy social media employees, they must
broaden their views of celebrity and injury to publicity rights to meet contemporary notions and
established law. In 2015, the District Court for the Eastern Division of Illinois held that a grocery
chain infringed basketball-great Michael Jordan’s publicity rights when it published a print ad in
a 2009 commemorative edition of Sports Illustrated magazine congratulating Mr. Jordan on his
induction to the Basketball Hall of Fame.285 The mere association of the business with the
famous man—even in a congratulatory context—without his consent triggered a judgment
against the defendant of $8.9 million.286 In contrast, social media employees who have contested
their publicity rights have come away with no damages, even when they successfully made a
prima facie showing of a violation to their publicity rights.287
Existing law provides that the measure of damages for a publicity rights violation is the
“fair market value of the property right in plaintiff’s identity which defendant has used without
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permission.”288 For celebrities, such a market value is often ascertained by expert testimony as to
comparables: “amounts received by comparable persons for comparable uses.” 289 For noncelebrities, the calculus should be similar, without bias.
Thus, questions courts might consider under this fifth prong include:

Did the employee’s identity have a fair market value independent of his
employer?

If so, did the employer cause injury to the employee by usurping the employee’s
identity without consent?

What is the fair market value of the employee’s contribution or identity?

How much would the employer likely pay to another to create what it took from
the employee?
The foregoing five-part analysis represents a step forward in thinking about the scope of
celebrity and social media—and their value in the modern world. A view of information, as a
hybrid between property and reputation, as Eric Schmidt suggests,290 will help courts fashion a
legal framework that reflects the modern reality and understanding of social media.

CONCLUSION
“People don’t belong to people.”291
Social media interactions are often an extension of the self. Yet they can also be sources of
individual and corporate value. However, when it comes to the rights of employees to their social
media, the law is conflicted and unclear. To date, litigants, courts, and commentators have miscast
this issue, blurring it with a panoply of ill-fitting legal theories, from trade secret to conversion. At
the core of these cases is the right to control a social media profile and to continue to interact with
its audience, a desire inextricably intertwined with an individual’s personality and work product.
With a firmer understanding of the prevalent norms of social media, we argue that
reasoning grounded in publicity rights provides a better lens through which to view an employee’s
social media activity: Individuals should be entitled to protection against those who seek to
misappropriate their work, personae, and goodwill for economic gain, except when their work falls
squarely in the scope of their employment. On that basis, this article proposes an analysis that
applies publicity rights and balances the employee’s professional and dignitary interests against
the employer’s commercial concerns. It is only by taking into account the reality of social media
interaction, its value on multiple levels, and each party’s legitimate expectations that we can begin
to balance the many interests that compete for social media’s innovative assets and update the law
to reflect our modern reality.
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APPENDIX A – MULTIFACTOR QUESTIONS
Factor One Questions:




Did the employee create the social media profile in question? If so, on whose behalf? Or
alternatively, did the employee inherit the forum?
Is the social media forum predominantly personal or job-related in nature?
The nature of the social media platform (i.e. LinkedIn, Facebook, and so on), and
whether more than one social media account is at issue.

Factor Two Questions:




Was building a social media audience on behalf of the employer a critical part of the
employee’s job description? Was the employee hired for a marketing or communicationsrelated post?
Was the employee’s social media audience a factor in his or her hiring? Did the employee
bring the majority of the social media audience with him when he began working for the
employer?
Would it matter which party was acting to terminate the relationship?

Factor Three Questions:




Did the employer require employees to maintain and cultivate a social media audience?
Did the employer give guidance as to the employee’s social media presence? Did the
employer openly monitor or control the subject forum and postings?
Whether the content that is posted is publicly available, or whether the employee also
relied upon privacy settings in some cases to limit access
Whether the employer required access to the account - username and password info.

Factor Four Questions:






Is the social media forum infused with the personality and identity of the employee? Was
it representative of the individual?
Did the employee have other social media accounts?
Did the employee enjoy social media recognition or notoriety independent of the
employer?
Did the employee write or create the majority of his/her own content?
Did the employee amass the social media audience under his or her own name or was he
or she writing anonymously or pseudonymously on behalf of the employer?

Factor Five Questions:




Did the employee’s identity have a fair market value independent of his employer?
If so, did the employer cause injury to the employee by usurping the employee’s identity
without consent?
What is the fair market value of the employee’s contribution or identity?
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How much would the employer likely pay to another to create what it took from the
employee?
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Case
PhoneDog v.
Kravitz
(N.D. Cal. 2011)

Eagle v. Morgan
(E.D. Pa. 2013)

Maremont v.
Susan Fredman
Design Group,
Ltd.

Nature of the Case

An “interactive mobile
Twitter
news and reviews web
resource suing a former
blogger for his continued
use of a company Twitter
account.
Former executive suing
her company and her
replacement over who
controlled a LinkedIn
account.

LinkedIn

Employee suing
company for making
posts from her Facebook
and Twitter pages
without her permission.

Facebook

Fan page creator suing
BET over a conflict
involving BET
“migrating” fans of one
page to an official page
without the creator’s
permission.

Facebook

(N.D. Ill. 2011)

Mattocks v. Black
Entm’t Television
(S.D. Fla. 2014)

Table 1

Platform(s)
Involved

Twitter
Company
blog
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Legal Claims
 Misappropriation of Trade
Secrets
 Intentional/Negligent
Interference with a
Prospective Economic
Advantage
 Conversion
 Unauthorized Use of
Name
 Invasion of Privacy
 Misappropriation of
Publicity
 Identity Theft
 Conversion
 Tortious Interference with
Contract
 Civil Conspiracy
 Civil Aiding and Abetting
 Lanham Act (False
Endorsement)
 Stored Communications
Act
 Right to Publicity
 Common Law Right to
Privacy





Tortious Interference with
Contractual Relationships
Breach of Contract
Breach of Duty of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing
Conversion

